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“We changed the laws”: 
electoral practice and malpractice in Sudan since 19531 
Justin Willis and Atta el Battahani 
In 1983, a presidential referendum in Sudan returned the incumbent, Gaafar Nimeiri, to 
office further term in office.2 Behind the press reports of an overwhelming turnout of voters 
and almost unanimous support was a rather different reality,  as one former administrator 
recalled:  
In  the same elections, there was the Minister of Education and he was in charge of 
the whole Northern Region, and I was one of the administrators working with him.. . 
. . He called me one day and said “ Mohammed! there are some polling stations 
where the voting percentage is less than 90%. . We ...all  the regional supervisors are 
competing ..that we have to reach 96 %... so every one of us wants his province to 
be over 96%! ” I said “ How can I do that, the election’s finished?” . . . He told me 
that the laws are made by the Revolution Command Council,  and they changed the 
law.. .3 
Mohammed, in turn, had called in his subordinates, and explained to them that the law had 
been changed and they needed to collect more votes. They returned within hours, ballot 
boxes full; when he asked how it was that they had managed to collect votes so quickly from 
                                                          
Professor Justin Willis, Department of History, University of Durham. Justin.Willis@durham.ac.uk 
Dr Atta el-Battahani, Department of Political Science, University of Khartoum, elbattahani@yahoo.com 
 Much of the research for this paper was conducted during the course of a project entitled ‘Learning from 
experience: the history of elections in Sudan since 1953’. The project was managed by the Rift valley Institute 
and funded by the Department for International Development, and the principal researchers were the authors 
of this paper and Professor Peter Woodward of the University of Reading. Kamal Mustafa Ahmed, Gihan Tahir, 
Hisham Bilal, Will Berridge and Zoe Cormack all worked as research assistants on this project; the help and 
advice of John Ryle is gratefully noted, as are the comments of the editors and anonymous reviewers of 
African Affairs and the cooperation of the National Record Office in Khartoum and the Sudan Archive, Durham. 
2
 See the newspaper coverage in, for example, As-Sahafa, 17 Apr. 1983; and the ‘results’ in the same paper on 
30 Apr. 1983. 
3
 Interview, Mohammed Sharif Fadhul, Khartoum, 24 Feb. 2009. 
2 
 
polling stations which were more than a day’s travel away, they replied – ‘we also changed 
the laws!’ 
This anecdote of electoral failure immediately evokes some of the multiple spectres which 
hang over the elections planned for Sudan in 2010. Conceived as one of the most important 
milestones of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), these elections were intended to 
help  ensure a lasting and peaceful settlement to the conflict in southern Sudan. This aim 
can be readily located in a pervasive international logic which sees the secret ballot as the 
key to political transformation, possessed of an almost magical force to end conflict and 
deliver just government, and it has been suggested that these elections were inserted into 
the process at the insistence of the international sponsors of the CPA.4 Yet Mohammed’s  
story recalls a recent history of state-ordered malpractice and official connivance, of 
elections which are no more than sham; in this more immediate context, how can elections 
be a success?  Sudan has had many elections over the last six decades; none has produced a  
government which has been both widely accepted and stable. This paper explores the 
history of elections by secret ballot in Sudan since the 1950s, to  try and identify how these 
have all – in different ways – been problematic, and to consider what this history may reveal 
about the likely outcomes of the planned election. 
Studying elections 
In Sudan, as elsewhere in Africa, elections with adult suffrage and a secret ballot were 
innovations of the last years of colonial rule. The  sudden rise of the secret ballot to 
centrality in the political system was partly the result of the demands of nationalist 
politicians – who saw the secret ballot in itself as a mark of responsible nationhood, and a 
battering ram against the last redoubts of colonial rule.  But these elections were also the 
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last and most ambitious disciplinary project of the colonial state, a final exercise in listing, 
queuing and counting.5 
The post-colonial chronology of Sudan’s elections has been a little atypical, in African terms, 
as will be detailed below; but here as elsewhere there have been both multi-party and 
single-party elections, bombastic announcements of overwhelming turnouts in single-
candidate polls and, sometimes, lively local competition for votes. And in Sudan, as 
elsewhere, the holding of elections by secret ballot has been partly the consequence of 
external pressure and of a reflexive mimesis: as the Chair of Sudan’s Election Commission 
told the public in 1958 ‘the yes of the world are upon you’.6   
Studies of elections across the continent have also explored the role of elections in 
constructing and maintaining networks of clientelism or purging members of the ruling 
group who have fallen from favour.7 In arguing a deep history of electoral behaviour in 
Africa some have implied that all methods of elections are somehow similar, and that the 
secret ballot is no more than a means to deal with larger numbers.8 But elections by secret 
ballot are different.  As Tom Young has noted, the use of the secret ballot has not been 
solely a result of  direct external pressure, or the pursuit of tactical political ends; it has been 
bundled up with the wider project of modernity and development to which most post-
colonial African states have been rhetorically committed - however illusory that project may 
have proven.9  Studies have repeatedly suggested  the secret ballot has been seen  – even 
by the most authoritarian regimes – as a source of legitimacy;10 Young argues that the 
secret ballot had that potential power because it offers - for some, at least - an imaginary 
ideal,  the performative enactment of the relationship between the modern, organizing 
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state and the disciplined individual rational citizen; the secret ballot is, in this sense, a grand 
venture in the modern state project which Timothy Mitchell has called ‘enframing’. 11  
Recent historical/ethnographic work on the secret ballot has similarly stressed the way that 
electoral performance has been seen as a tool  to remake political subjectivities. People are 
listed, marshalled, identified; and then they are presented with a single moment of political 
choice, in which they are demonstratively separated from kin and neighbours, from sheikh 
and priest, landlord and employer.12 It is an approach which has some resonance – though 
in very different language - with Staffan Lindberg’s suggestion that the secret ballot helps to 
embed new forms of political practice.13 In Sudan, as elsewhere, elections by secret ballot 
have been held because at least some Sudanese have seen them as part of this state 
project, a performance aimed not at an external audience but at the Sudanese populace 
themselves. 
But commitment to this ideal varied, and this paper will argue that understanding the 
history of the secret ballot in Sudan entails some unpacking of the complex bundle of 
interests and processes that we call, summarily, ‘the state’. Elections’, as Mackenzie and 
Robinson understatedly put it, ‘are administratively complex’. 14 In focussing in particular on 
the detail of this complexity – on what actually happened in the registration process, and in 
the polling booth – the paper will draw attention to the particular position and interests of 
administrative officials, as distinct from the politicians whose doings have been the usual 
focus of electoral studies. In Sudan, the self-conscious awareness of an administrative cadre 
that they were the embodiment of a modern, national state was immensely important; for 
them the disciplinary national project of the election was a central part of their duty. Yet 
their desire to realize the electoral ideal has always been  thwarted: by the immense 
challenges of the operation in a country as large as Sudan, and by political conflicts which in 
themselves were partly the product of this group’s narrow vision of the modernizing 
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nation.15  In northern Sudan, the secret ballot has been undermined by the chronic political 
rivalry between Muslim sectarian leaders (who have often enlisted ethnic sentiments in 
their struggles);16 in the south, the secret ballot has been tarnished by its association with 
an authoritarian and violent  state.17  But elections have also been undermined from within; 
administrators in Sudan have shared the sense of some politicians that while the secret 
ballot may be a powerful disciplinary tool, care must be taken lest its unpredictable results 
endanger the project of modernity itself, by handing power to an uneducated rural mass.18  
And so they have acquiesced in formal arrangements, and extra-legal behaviours, that have 
added to an impression of state partiality. 
The gloomy tone of many studies of elections in Africa has been informed by a belief that 
cheating has reduced the process to “kangaroo” elections, sham events which  satisfy 
international opinion but offer no real change;19 Paul Collier’s recent work has argued that 
the secret ballot in poor countries increases violence, because voters are driven by ethnic 
sentiment, and elites cheat.20   Clearly, elections have not helped to transform the 
relationship between citizen and subject in Sudan, but this paper argues that cheating by 
‘politicianshas not been the only problem.  In a very large country with poor 
communications, where much of the population is unused to the routinizing disciplinary 
processes of bureaucracy, it is not cheap or easy to perform all the multiple procedures of 
the secret ballot to a consistent standard. The Sudanese state has always been short of 
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skilled personnel, and of other resources and. where resources and time are short, 
performance can slip easily into pretence.   This paper will suggest that elections by secret 
ballot can in such circumstances become the exact inverse of their idealization – serving as 
demonstrations  of the partial, corrupt and incompetent nature of power, demoralizing and 
discrediting officials and providing an opportunity for the assertion of the continued vitality 
of collective ties of religion and ethnicity. 
Electoral studies have noted a tendency for international observers to be inordinately 
impressed by visible evidence of the performance of some processes of the secret ballot.21 
This paper will argue that in the case of  Sudan’s multi-party elections, problems have been 
partly masked by observers who, impressed by the absence of the  flagrant cheating which 
characterized Nimeiri’s referenda, were inclined to gloss over problems of procedure. This 
was true of both diplomats  (who were, for example, cheerfully upbeat about the 1968 
election despite the tiny turnout in southern Sudan and the murder of the leader of the 
largest southern party by the army during the campaign) and of academics, some of whom 
displayed a sort of condescending indulgence (praising the ‘remarkable performance’ of 
elections while noting almost in passing  that problems of transport made it impossible for 
some officials to keep to timetables for registration and polling  in rural Sudan).22  The 
uncritical attitude of these observers reflected – and was no doubt partly driven by – the 
very strong sense that elections had come to be seen as a display of international 
respectability; a test which had to be passed for a new nation to be taken seriously.23  
Learning to vote: the elections of the 1950s 
The comparatively rapid adoption of the secret ballot in Sudan was driven by the complex 
political rivalries  of its colonial rulers, Egypt and Britain. Each sought to win the support of 
the educated Sudanese  elite with concessions, including the ballot; in consequence, Sudan 
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became independent of both powers in 1956, after a ‘self-government election’ at the end 
of 1953.24 The election, held very largely by secret ballot (against the wishes of some British 
officials)  manifested several characteristics which were to be enduring.  Principal among 
these was the sense that the secret ballot was a mark of political maturity, and that election 
by secret ballot was an existential test of nationhood; if Sudanese administrators  could run 
such an election, and Sudanese people vote in it, then Sudan had proved its readiness for 
independence. As one politician put it ‘when the eyes of the whole world are focussed 
towards our country, it is our duty to prove that we can govern ourselves’.25  The 
‘committees’ of administrators and other public servants who ran the election were 
explicitly driven by this sense of national duty, proudly reporting how ‘calm’ and ‘orderly’ 
the polls were; symptomatically, in some constituencies the end of the ballot saw self-
congratulatory celebrations, not for the winning candidates but for electoral officials.26 It 
was this shared experience of the election which helped give Sudan’s parliament the 
confidence to declare independence two years later – even though the majority of its 
members had been elected on the basis of a nominal commitment to union with Egypt. 
The second characteristic was a sense among officials that the overall electoral performance 
was more important than whether or not particular  people, or groups, could actually 
exercise their right to vote. Exasperated by the constant complaints of British officials that 
rural Sudanese – and especially southern Sudanese – might be unable to participate 
properly in elections by secret ballot, the chair of the international Mixed Electoral 
Commission which was supervising the process wrote that ‘the Commission recognizes that 
in the conditions prevailing in the south, there is a risk that elections held under any 
procedure might not be an unqualified success . . . it will not improve matters, however, if 
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responsible officials go on repeating time after time that elections cannot be held 
properly.’27 The message was clear – elections must be held, even if some people would be 
excluded from them. For the same reason, the Commission turned a blind eye to the many 
complaints received from all sides about electoral malpractice – notably the use of bribes 
and official intimidation -  because they feared  that rigorous investigation or punishment 
might  lead one party or another to denounce the whole process.28 Just making sure that 
the election happened became the most important goal of the Commission.29 
This willingness to accept the exclusion of large numbers of potential voters was the 
corollary of a kind of political elitism which was built into the 1953 elections, and was itself 
reflective of the ‘bifurcation’ of the colonial state.30 Ninety-two seats in parliament were 
elected by ‘territorial constituencies’, with adult male suffrage; these had an average 
population of around 100,000 each. There were an additional five seats for the ‘graduates’ 
constituency’, which offered additional representation to those who had completed 
secondary education; in total, just over 2,400 graduates registered to vote in this 
constituency. This additional representation drew on imperial precedent – university seats 
in the UK had only recently been abolished – but it also reflected the acute sense among 
educated Sudanese that they were a small minority, with special rights and duties: 
‘Educated people are guided more by their ideas than the various sects . . . *the graduate 
vote] sets up a genuinely intellectual support – and the most honourable of all – for the 
coming Parliament’.31 The fear among the educated  that the universal franchise might hand 
power to sectarian or tribal leaders who could command the votes of large numbers of 
uneducated followers, was to be a constant factor in the politics of  independent Sudan; and 
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a series of systems were to be devised to give special weight to the votes of the ‘modern’.32 
That the graduates saw themselves as a group with particular political rights and 
responsibilities was clear from the very high turnout for the graduates’ constituency, of  
around 80%; by contrast, the territorial constituencies saw a much lower turnout.33  
The sense that elections were a national duty was even more evident in the election of 
1958. The Chairman of the Election Commission which supervised the process was the 
senior civil servant who had been secretary to the Mixed International Commission of 1953; 
he wrote to his subordinates that  
I on behalf of all the Commission wish you and all your officials the best in the great 
task that lies ahead . . . we are all confident that we shall in future look back with 
pride to the great achievements and service you have all rendered this country.34 
His Commission bombarded its staff with telegrams and  directives which exhorted them to 
register as many voters as possible and  set out how every step of the election should be 
handled (with detailed lists of required items for polling stations) and told them that ‘You 
must satisfy yourselves that the voters are keeping order and are forming themselves into a 
smart queue’.35 There is no doubt that the Election Commission took its job seriously; so 
much is clear from the barely-suppressed outrage in its final report over the gerrymandered 
constituency boundaries which were imposed on it by the government.36 But its directives 
were simply impossible to follow and so, ironically, had the effect of encouraging deviation 
from process.37  
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At the root of this developing disconnection between an elaborate fantasy of precise 
directives and a reality of inconsistent or chaotic process lay a lack of resources. Although 
the Election Commission was able to call on the labour of several thousand local 
government officers and teachers, there were not enough educated staff to cover the whole 
of this vast country. Registering and polling teams had to move around, collecting names 
and votes over an extended period - but there was not enough transport.38 Returning 
officers were told that they must hold ‘rehearsals’: 
Ensure that candidates, their agents or polling agents also attend rehearsals. Exhibit widely 
Election Films at these rehearsals. Rehearsals will be of no use unless they are held two or 
three times weekly. All Presiding and Polling Officers must compulsorily attend these 
rehearsals.39 
 Three weeks before the elections, they were told that rehearsals should henceforth be 
daily.40 But in rural constituencies scattered staff could not be brought together in advance 
– because they had other jobs, and there was no transport; and anyway there were few 
copies of the films, and even fewer mobile cinemas.41 The film shows were a kind of double 
administrative fantasy: an acted display of order, which officials were directed to show even 
though it was impossible for them to do so. In a more plaintive moment, the Chair of the 
Election Commission wrote that ‘It is sincerely hoped that the whole election will work as 
nicely as it was planned on paper.’42 
It did not, and the disparity in electoral experience already suggested by the 1953 statistics 
became more acute as a result. Where the state was at its strongest, in the riverain north – 
where there were trained staff, and vehicles, and where education levels among the 
population were also higher – both registration and turnout were good, encouraging a  
profound self-congratulation among  officials: ‘we must thank the Election Commission for 
the honour it bestowed on us by enabling us to perform a notable piece of work for our 
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country’.43 But elsewhere, registration and turnout were much lower, and reports suggested 
that the electoral process, desperately short of resources, ground to a halt in the face of 
popular suspicion.44 The electoral experience of potential voters in Upper Nile, where only 
one in fifty of the populace voted, was very different to that of those in greater Khartoum, 
where around one in ten people cast their ballot.45 In some ways this is rather like the ‘legal 
disfranchisement’, described by Frederic Schaffer – but in this case propelled not by 
‘cleaning’ up the election, but by  a  willingness to accept failures in the procedures required 
for such an election.46 
The elections of the 1960s 
Within months of the 1958 election, the military took power – encouraged to do so by a 
prime minister who feared to lose a parliamentary vote. The failure of the electoral process 
to win widespread support was perhaps evident enough in the way that the coup passed 
‘without a murmur of public protest’.47 The next six years saw a steady slide into outright 
civil war in the south, accelerated by the increasingly authoritarian and narrow vision of 
progress pursued by the military government.48 When popular unrest brought down the 
military government in the ‘October revolution’ of 1964, multi-party elections for a 
‘Constituent Assembly’, which would provide the basis of government and would be 
responsible for approving a new constitution, soon followed. The overthrow of the military 
regime was really a movement of educated, urban northern Sudanese, a political moment in 
Khartoum, led by students and intellectuals rather than a popular revolution across the 
country. Elections were for this group – intimately linked as they were with Sudan’s 
administrators and politicians -  a reaffirmation of Sudan’s status as a modern nation, a 
demonstration of the viability of the Sudanese state. While some argued for a delay in 
elections until a settlement could be reached in the south, the major northern political 
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parties insisted on an early election.49 There were bitter disputes over process, and 
partocuarly over the issue of votes for women and the graduates consitituency.50  The result 
was a compromise, with universal adult suffrage and an increased number of graduates’ 
seats; there followed a rushed poll,  preceded by some vigorous gerrymandering by the 
major sectarian parties.51 The election was entirely abandoned across most of southern 
Sudan in the face of a combination of widespread suspicion, violence in some areas, and a 
lack of the staff and transport. Despite the upbeat reports of some observers, there were 
also problems in the process in parts of northern Sudan. In ‘nomad and semi-nomad’ areas 
voter registration was based on lists supplied by the traditional leaders on whom local 
administration relied. Elsewhere, registration was supposed to be direct; in fact, many 
registration officials, who were under constant pressure to ensure a high level of 
registration, simply accepted lists of names supplied by parties (which, given the poor state 
of national organization of most parties, really meant the agents of local candidates).52  
No voters’ cards were issued; lists of names were typed up into alphabetical electoral 
registers. The names on these were numbered sequentially in the order that they were 
added to the register, but voters could find this out only by consulting the typed final 
register. While this was supposed to be displayed for public inspection, this was often done 
late, if at all, so that very few voters would have actually been able to look for their names 
or numbers before polling day.53 Even in Khartoum, the official report on the elections 
noted that ‘There was inadequate time for registration , which caused many mistakes which 
could have been avoided’.54 Bechtold’s rather carefully worded description suggests 
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something of the consequent problems with registers which were, for the voters and for 
officials,  the only proof of eligibility to vote: 
An additional difficulty lay in the state most registration lists were in, particularly in 
view of the problem of arranging the names correctly in alphabetical order. It can be 
estimated that roughly three-fourths or more of all Sudanese names begins with one 
of three letters 
Bechtold slipped into a footnote the further observation that ‘most literate Sudanese were 
not at all sure of the correct sequence of letters in the Arabic alphabet’ .55 
In response to these problems, the agents of candidates went beyond the provision of 
names for registration, and in some cases they helped voters find their names (or names like 
theirs) on the lists; they would then write the sequential number on a piece of paper which 
the voter could then use to try and persuade the polling station staff of his or her right to 
vote.56  Where there was no such assistance, voters just had to hope that harassed polling 
staff would find their names, possibly over the objections of rival agents who might 
challenge their right to vote.57 Would-be voters who had some education and a degree of 
cultural confidence in dealing with officials, and had some familiarity in bureaucratic 
procedures, would have been most likely to succeed in casting a vote.  In rural areas, where 
it was unlikely that candidates would be able to arrange this kind of assistance to voters, 
people were very much reliant on their relationship with local men of influence, who served 
as ‘identifiers’ at each polling station, and whose role was to confirm – or challenge – the 
identity of those who sought to vote. 
Taking lists of voters from candidates’ agents, and turning a blind eye to the presence of 
agents around the polling station, were unacknowledged ways of ‘changing the law’. So too 
was the acceptance of a developing culture of feeding, entertaining and transporting 
possible voters. In 1953, transporting voters had – after some uncertainty - been forbidden, 
and while there had been a good deal of gift-giving in an attempt to influence both voters 
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and candidates, this had been limited to some extent by the possibility of legal action.58  But 
by the 1960s, both the provision of transport to bring voters to the polling station, and the 
feeding of voters while they were waiting to vote, had become widespread.59 Given the 
distance that some rural voters had to travel to reach polling stations, and the possibility 
that once there they would be required to queue for hours as officials struggled with the 
registers, this kind of provision made it much more likely that voters would turn out; but it 
was, of course, entirely dependent on the resources and organizing capacity of the 
candidates in any particular constituency. The consequence was a considerable disparity in 
turnout in different parts of northern Sudan, which was in some areas very low.60 
In southern Sudan, by-elections were eventually held in 1967. This was not because levels of 
violence had diminished -  if anything, they had worsened, though the final report of the 
Election Commission blandly remarked that ‘voting began calmly in the south’.61 It was more 
simply that Sadiq al Mahdi, whose Umma party had come out of the 1965 vote with the 
largest number of seats but no clear control of parliament, thought that he could win seats 
in the south - where the only people likely to register and vote were officials, police and 
soldiers - cheaply and easily.62    Umma did win more of the southern seats than did any 
other party, in many cases with very small turnouts.63 While the official report of the 
election glossed over problems,  newspaper accounts from southern Sudan suggest that 
practice was very far indeed from the letter of the law: 
The opening of the polls has been shrouded with secrecy. Apart from announcements that 
the polls would open today, no clarification has been made whether or not polling opens in 
all the 34 constituencies all over the south or by stages, province by province, or 
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constituency by constituency. No usual announcements of polling stations in each 
constituency have been made, nor of how long polling would take in each constituency. . . .  
. . .   many  supposed voters on the list have never known that their names are on the list for 
voting, and this is bound to keep the percentage of the polling very low.64 
 A few months later voters in both north and south went to the polls again, as rival sectarian 
parties struggled to achieve a parliamentary majority; registration and turnout were 
generally higher than in 1965/7, but were again extremely low in the south where ‘in many 
constituencies, the army and the police were virtually the only people on the electoral 
rolls’.65  Even in Khartoum, officials complained of shortages of transport and a lack of 
trained staff. 66 
Turnout by province in parliamentary election, stated as percentage of estimated population (and 
as absolute number)67.  
 1958 1965/7 1968 1986 
Khartoum 
15  
(82,598) 
16 
(120,135) 
25 
(193,938) 
       35 
(634,631)     
Kordofan 
10 
(188,093) 
12 
(240,718) 
15 
(306,763) 
19 
(559,344) 
Northern 
10  
(97,543) 
10  
(99,342) 
18 
(183,281) 
39 
(392,986) 
Kassala 
9    
(91,842) 
7    
(97,842) 
11 
(164,899) 
22 
(490,607) 
Blue Nile 
14 
(315,597) 
17 
(454,351) 
22 
(615,542) 
32 
(1,246,874) 
Darfur 
7    8  14 15 
                                                          
64
 The Vigilant, 8 Mar. 1967. 
65 ‘Discussion with Sayed Hilary Logali, Aug. 1968, TNA FCO 39/185; see also J. Howell, ‘Politics in the southern 
Sudan’, African Affairs, 72 (1973),  163-78. 
66
 ‘Final report on elections, Khartoum Province’, 1968, NRO Elecom (4) 1/18/114. 
67
 Sources: Election Commission’s Final report, 1958,  Appendix D; Abushouk, Al Intikhabat, 148; Bechtold, 
Politics in the Sudan, Table 7.2, 7.5; statistical appendices to the Final Report of the Election Commission, 1986. 
16 
 
(94,599) (113,841) (213,240) (611,915) 
Bahr el Ghazal 
7    
(77,193) 
8     
(104,270) 
8   
(106,865) 
1       
(8,267) 
Upper Nile 
6    
(53,992) 
3    
(33,541) 
5    
(58,994) 
2     
(33,818) 
Equatoria 
9    
(85,908) 
<1    
(5,633) 
2    
(22,383) 
6     
(95,786) 
Total 10 
(1,087,355) 
10 
(1,269,653) 
14 
(1,865,905) 
20 
(4,074,228) 
 
 
 
Single-party elections 
In terms of building popular support for elected government, the multi-party elections of 
the 1960s were as unsuccessful as those of the 1950s. When Gaafar Nimeiri led a coup in 
May 1969, the government was again removed without  public protest.68 Nimeiri and the 
self-consciously radical intellectuals who supported him were dismissive of ‘liberal 
democracy’; ‘the good climate for reactionarism and stoogism’, as one of their key 
documents put it.69 But the secret ballot – though not political parties – was to play a 
prominent part in the construction of a different kind of democracy. Nimeiri’s regime 
idealized ‘objective planning and modern science’; the disciplinary performances of the 
secret ballot  lent themselves well to the vision of state-directed national progress, as 
Nimeiri himself explained in one of his lengthy radio speeches: 
The rush of our people to the registration centres for the Presidential Referendum 
regardless of the results, represents an appreciated enlightenment which was 
received with pride and gratitude. 
The millions of people all over the country who were keen to perform their right in 
saying “Yes” or “No” were actually expressing the finest accomplishments of these 
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people and their victories. They were representing national unity and confirming the 
commitment towards the one country 
‘The millions who were practising their right were actually announcing their new belief in the 
unity of leadership against the variety of commitments, the unity of the land against the 
defeated sectarianism, regionalism and racism.70 
 
 Nimeiri held  three referenda on the position of the president, intended as public 
performances of allegiance.71  This was the context for the ballot-box stuffing described at 
the beginning of this paper, and for other farcical performances of the ‘secret ballot’, such 
as the use of a system of two ballot boxes, one for ‘yes’ votes and one for ‘no’ votes, 
positioned so that officials could clearly see which box the voter used.72 
The Nimeiri period also saw a series of elections to a parliament, or ‘Popular Assembly’.73 
These gave special political weight to people with certain kinds of education or 
employment, who would ‘represent the bodies of the May revolution’ in what were called 
‘sectoral’ seats.74 The list of sectoral seats became increasingly elaborate: alongside farmers 
and veterinarians there were seats for book-keepers, university graduates of agricultural 
professions and administrators.75 Few people  voted for this ‘sectoral’ representation, and  
those who did were mostly in urban areas. In 1980, one candidate was elected to represent 
the ‘economists and financial officers’ with a total of 732 votes nationally; 586 of these were 
cast in Khartoum.76  
Nimeiri’s elections were supervised by ‘Technical Election Committees’ which sent out 
streams of directives requiring officials to swear oaths and offering bombastic instructions: 
‘take part in many practice polls’,  urged one.77 But electoral procedure became ever more 
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remote from the ordered imaginary of these instructions. The pressures on the officials 
were  to provide lengthy lists of names to show how popular elections were, and to make 
sure that on election day many of those names were ticked off on lists.  In some places, 
officials neatly short-circuited the process, and  there was no registration; people turned up 
to vote and their names were written down as they voted. Elsewhere local officials carefully 
wrote up lists of names of tax-payers by hand in books; then separated these out into 
alphabetical order and used these as registers.78 In the final years of the regime, as 
shortages became ever more common, officials started to use ration lists to compose voting 
registers.79 In some territorial constituencies – which were very large – there were dozens of 
candidates, all standing with the approval of the SSU. Candidates relied entirely on tribal 
loyalty or personal popularity, and  the elections became an almost parodic performance of 
the rituals of the secret ballot. Ballot papers with 25 symbols for separate candidates were 
produced, but even this was not enough in some constituencies, and officials were 
instructed to fasten two of these papers together, though they were not told how voters 
should show whether they wanted the candidate represented by the tree on the first paper, 
or the one represented by the tree on the second paper.80   
Nimeiri lost power in 1985, unseated by popular unrest; as in 1964, politicians and 
administrators then turned to parliamentary elections by secret ballot as an assertion of 
Sudan’s continued viability as a state, and in the face of a rapidly escalating renewed war in 
the south.81 They were encouraged to do so partly by a desire for international 
respectability, but also because the major sectarian parties of northern Sudan believed that 
an election would allow them to mobilise a rural vote which would strengthen their hand 
against some of the more radical elements who had been involved in the uprising.82  There 
was much debate over the system to be used, which ended with an agreement that there 
would be 273 members of parliament elected by universal adult suffrage from geographical 
constituencies and 28 elected by  special graduates’ constituencies, in which the electorate 
would be composed of people who had two or more years of post-secondary education - 
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who, in the words of one official, had greater political ‘comprehension’.83 Once again, a 
three-man Election Commission was appointed (including one man who had served in the 
1968 Commission) and once again it busied itself with the issuing of directives. 
The major rebel movement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), boycotted 
the general election, arguing that a peace deal which addressed their demands for political 
transformation must be negotiated first. The interim administration in Khartoum pressed on 
with the election, determined to have the show of a national poll in defiance of the reality 
of widespread violence in the south, and the collapse of government control over significant 
areas. There was, in the event, no voting at all in thirty-seven of the sixty-eight southern 
constituencies; as in the 1960s, even in those southern constituencies where there was a 
vote, registration and turn-out were very poor. By contrast, registration and turn-out in 
greater Khartoum and in Northern Province – along the line of the Nile – were very high 
indeed. Even here, and despite the vigorous ideological differences between some of the 
competing parties - Communists, Ba’athists and the National Islamic Front (NIF) -
campaigning might rely on ties of family or locality, as one successful candidate for the NIF, 
an Islamist party, explained: 
I went to all centres, places you can find people, where you can have access: clubs, football 
clubs, especially, and the social clubs. Otherwise, the mosque. Every week, to visit the 
mosque, to say prayers and to speak after with them, informally.  So I find a lot of blood 
relationship, area allegiances where I come from in the north, and ideologically people were 
really unsure. . . .. It is family connections which you can bank on. . . .84 
HIgh registration and turnout in some areas rested on practises which contravened the 
formal directives of the Commission: accepting lists of voters, ignoring treating, transporting 
and oathing of voters, allowing agents to help prospective voters assert their right to vote at 
the polling station. Around Khartoum, the growing numbers of ‘internally displaced people’ 
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(IDPs) driven to the capital from western or southern Sudan by famine and war, provided a 
new body of voters, who could be manipulated by officials or government recognized chiefs: 
There were threats also, in the IDP centres. Because normally, the IDPs, some were being 
removed from place to place, so whoever talks much, or has this Islamic support, will be the 
one who will be elected. Because they were making use of the chiefs, the chiefs appointed in 
the IDP camps. Those people were being controlled by these chiefs. To go and vote, 
mobilising them to go.85 
Such practices also facilitated the considerable multiple voting and impersonation which is 
suggested by some very high – or simply impossible – turnout figures.86  Once again, there 
was gerrymandering of constituencies, and parties jockeyed to take advantage of the 
additional votes given to the educated. The NIF did this most successfully, ingeniously 
exploiting the regulations on expatriate graduate voters to ensure that it won the great 
majority of graduates’ seats.87 
 
In the parts of northern Sudan beyond the riverain heartland,  turnouts and registration 
were lower – though still much better than in the south - and the failures of procedure 
which partly lay behind this were heavily criticized by some Sudanese observers at the 
time.88 Again, registration and turnout in rural Sudan relied on the involvement of 
intermediaries, usually local figures who claimed some kind of authority based on tribe or 
religion.89 And when the military seized power again, in 1989, once more there was no 
popular movement in defence of the elected government. 
 
Elections and National Salvation 
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The group of soldiers and Islamist ideologues who seized power in June 1989 offered a new 
rationale for a succession of exercises involving the secret ballot:  presidential and 
parliamentary votes in 1996 and 2000, and a referendum on a new constitution in 1998. 
These were presented as both a departure from an imposed foreign form of democracy and 
as an intentional break with tradition (taqlid). Instead, they would be a tool for renewal 
(tajdid) - these terms being taken from wider debates over the role of Islam which stressed 
its role as a route to renewal. Elections would, at the same time, be an opportunity for the 
populace to express their allegiance, ba’ia,  to a leader whose acceptance of that allegiance 
implied that authority ultimately lay in the hands of God.90 Yet despite the emphasis on 
collective consensus, the secret ballot played a prominent role in each of these events. It 
was announced through the press and through speeches at mosques, that voting was a 
public  and a religious duty; and the organizers of elections took some pride in framing a 
new electoral law and regulations and in performing some of the rituals of the ballot – 
choosing symbols, sealing and unsealing boxes, and so on.91 The international press were 
invited, and the northern Sudanese press covered the votes at considerable length, 
solemnly offering figures on turnout and reporting alleged minor problems of procedure.92  
The elections were, however, widely criticized. In 1996  the many individuals who stood 
against the incumbent , Omer el Beshir, in the presidential race  were unknowns, the press 
were tightly-controlled, and state resources were freely used in support of the incumbent’s 
campaign. Registration, it was openly acknowledged, was conducted on the basis of putting 
together various existing lists of names.93 There were allegations that ballot boxes were 
stuffed by anxious officials, there were special voters’ lists for members of the uniformed 
forces and it was rumoured that millions of spoiled ballots were destroyed in order not to 
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tarnish the lustre of Beshir’s victory.94 There were apparently some new departures in 
malpractice: not only were government vehicles used to bring voters to polling stations, but 
in some cases ballot boxes were reported to have been taken to public gatherings – to 
weddings, or funerals – and people were given ballot papers to put in the boxes.95 These 
elections brought together, in striking fashion, two approaches to ‘changing the law’: the 
straightforward cheating which had developed in the Nimeiri period and the combination of 
a fantasy of procedure with a reality of multiple local expedients to push up participation 
rates.   
The coming election 
The elections originally planned for 2009, and now postponed to 2010, will be more 
complex than any previously attempted in Sudan. This is partly a consequence of the 
notional commitment to decentralization, espoused by a succession of regimes in 
Khartoum, and which has been the ironic counterpart to persistent state authoritarianism. 
Multiple levels of elected government have been created, and must be voted for: the 
national president; the president of the autonomous Government of Southern Sudan; the 
governor of each of the 26 ‘devolved’ states  into which Sudan is divided; the national 
parliament; the parliament of each state; and the parliament for southern Sudan. The 
elections for national, southern and state parliaments will be further complicated by the 
voting system. In each of these bodies, 60% of members will be elected by territorial 
constituencies, on a first-past-the post basis. There are no ‘graduates’ seats’, but the notion 
of special representation has emerged in a new form. 25% of seats in each parliament are 
reserved for women members, who will be elected on an adult franchise using a 
proportional representation system at the level of each state. A further 15% are reserved for 
‘party list’ members, elected on a similar basis. While the allocation of seats to women 
might be seen as a commendable commitment to empowering women, it is likely that the 
allowance of both women’s and party seats will benefit the ruling National Congress Party 
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(NCP), since campaigning at a state level will require resources and organizational capacity 
beyond the capacity of any individual, and probably also beyond the abilities of the old 
sectarian parties, which have been weakened by factionalism and their long exclusion from 
power.  
These arrangements will also make voting a very complicated process. In northern Sudan, 
each voter will cast eight ballots (one presidential, one gubernatorial, three for the national 
parliament and three for the state parliament). In southern Sudan, there will be twelve 
ballots – those above, plus one for the southern president and three for the southern 
parliament. If each voter casts all these ballots at the same time, it is likely that the process 
of polling will be very lengthy; if the votes are held on different days, the demands on staff 
and transport will be multiplied.96  
The election is already threatened by the failure of the NCP to create the freedom of 
association and movement needed for an election, and especially by displacement and 
violence in Darfur.97 It is threatened also by the fallout from the botched census of 2008, 
which was intended to provide data for constituency demarcation and seat allocation. 
Through a combination of logistical unpreparedness and political maladroitness on the part 
of the SPLM, this resulted in what would seem to be a substantial undercounting of the 
southern populace. The Government of Southern Sudan formally rejected the census, and 
the allocation of constituencies which has just been made on the basis of this; what the 
consequences of this will be for the election is not yet clear.98 And while there is evident 
enthusiasm in at least some parts of Sudan for the idea of a process that will allow people to 
choose their leaders, it seems that popular understanding of the particular processes of the 
secret ballot is considerably more limited.99 
The process of registration, which is just being completed at the time of writing (December 
2009) offers some suggestion of what may come. Information from northern Sudan has 
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been patchy; in the south, reports suggested a slow start and multiple logistical problems.100 
These were followed by repeated government pronouncements on the importance of the 
process (a message reinforced by lorry loads of soldiers who toured urban areas threatening 
to arrest any who had failed to register); surprisingly high registration statistics have now 
been announced, though observers report continued logistical problems.101 How rigorous 
the registration process has really been remains unclear. 
  Since 1953, elections in Sudan have repeatedly fallen short of the ideal of the election as a 
moment of shared national participation, which teaches responsible citizenship and 
demonstrates the impartiality and organizing ability of the state. Both multi-party and 
authoritarian elections have confirmed the differential nature of citizenship in a state where 
a fantasy of bureaucratic regularity lies over a reality of multiple networks of kinship, 
cultural familiarity, tribe and religious affiliation, and where officials have struggled to cover 
up the gap between the imaginary state of ordered efficiency and the reality ofconstant, 
expedient, deviation from process.  When the election comes it is depressingly likely that, 
quite apart from attempts at direct cheating, and  problems with intimidation, censorship, 
restrictions on movement and misuse of government resources,  it will see multiple failures 
in procedure, driven by shortages of transport and personnel and material. The  experience 
of many voters will once again be one of confusion, uncertainty,  reliance on intermediaries 
– or, more simply, of exclusion.  
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